

PALESTINE ESSAYS No. 13

ZIONISM,
SOUTH AFRICA AND APARTHEID:
THE PARADOXICAL TRIANGLE

By

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PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH CENTER

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Beirut, Lebanon
October 1969

FOREWORD

The P.L.O. Research Center, true to its belief that its field of study is whatever concerns Zionism and wherever Zionism gains influence, in order that we may make our enemy better known to the world, welcomes the opportunity of publishing Professor Richard Stevens' essay on Zionism in South Africa.

Professor Stevens is the Director of the African Studies Program and Chairman of the Political Science Department at Lincoln University, Pennsylvania. He has published earlier a very interesting and useful study, *American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947*. In this essay his study of Zionism concentrates, not on America, but on South Africa.

ZIONISM, SOUTH AFRICA AND APARTHEID : THE PARADOXICAL TRIANGLE

The Nationalist Party and Anti-Semitism, 1930-1947

Considering the anti-Semitic record of the Nationalist Party in South Africa in the years preceding its electoral victory of 1948, Professor Keppel-Jones' prediction about the same time of an officially sanctioned pogrom in 1956¹ appeared to many as fully consistent with the Nationalist record. It was, after all, as recently as 1930 that Dr. Daniel F. Malan introduced his immigration quota bill restricting immigration from eastern Europe. This bill, fathered by the man destined to lead the Nationalist Party to victory in 1948, was adopted as the Quota Act of 1930 and effectively reduced Jewish immigration from eastern Europe to a trickle. When Hitler's attacks upon German Jewry led to the immigration of several thousand German Jews, Nazi-inspired elements within the Nationalist Party openly advocated that South Africa adopt similar measures. Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, Malan's close associate and eventual successor as prime minister, also launched his political career in the same period of anti-Semitic outpourings. One of Verwoerd's first political actions was to lead a deputation to Prime Minister Hertzog to ask that he refuse admission to Jewish refugees.² In 1936 an Aliens Act instituted a new system of controlling immigration which in effect meant that until the end of the war no more than fifty Jews a year entered the country.

(1) A. Keppel-Jones, *When Smuts Goes* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1950), pp. 31f.

(2) Leonard M. Thompson, *Politics in the Republic of South Africa* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 157.

The blatant anti-Semitic policy of the Nationalist Party continued until 1945. Through its attacks on "Jewish democracy" and "Jewish capitalism" the Party clearly indicated that Jews were not far behind "kafirs" in terms of its defined prejudices. During this period some Afrikaners favored the disfranchisement of all "un-assimilable" groups and Jews were specifically included in this category. Rarely was a person of Jewish background admitted to the Nationalist Party and through its recognized organ, *Die Transvaler*, edited by Dr. Verwoerd, the "Jewish imperialistic war machine" and Jewish immigration were attacked. The anti-Jewish policies of the Nationalist Party were officially proclaimed in their election manifesto of 1938 and reaffirmed three years later. Not even the defeat of Nazi Germany in April 1945 brought an immediate end to Nationalist support of Nazi principles.³

The South African Jewish Community and Zionism

By 1945 the South African Jewish community was set at something over 105,000 and grew to 120,000 five years later.⁴ While not the dominant economic force in the country, Jews clearly controlled certain industries such as clothing manufacture and the cinema. Although few Jews were farmers those who turned to agriculture were heavy investors in machinery and both the "potato king" and the "maize king" were Jews.⁵ The vast majority of the group, some 80 per cent, traced their origins to Lithuania thus making for an unusual degree of homogeneity.⁶ By 1948, however, approximately 46 per cent were South African born. Despite their original poverty, Jewish immigrants, like all white immigrants to South Africa, quickly discovered that the racial inequalities of the country allowed for upward group mobility; the working class element soon became

(3) R.G. Weisbord, "Dilemma of South African Jewry," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. V (September 1967), pp. 234-35.

(4) Bernard Sachs, "South Africa: Life on a Volcano, the Jewish Community in a Caste Society," *Commentary*, Vol. IX (June 1950), p. 530.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 532.

(6) Dan Jacobson, "The Jews of South Africa: Portrait of a Flourishing Community," *Commentary*, Vol. XXIII (January 1957), p. 39.

a small minority. According to many observers, the South African Jewish community had, by the end of the war, become the wealthiest Jewish community in the world on a per capita basis.⁷ Nor was the size of the Jewish community, as Rabbi Dr. Andre Ungar observed, a true reflection of the position of the Jews in South African life:

“...it would be a grievous mistake to underestimate the significance of the Jewish minority. Even purely numerically speaking, under the absurd rules of South African ethnic arithmetic, the size of the Jewish population constitutes a factor necessary to reckon with. . . . South Africa is the land *par excellence* where minorities can have a say—and a vast majority be deprived of it—quite without regard to what, in a democracy, their numbers would warrant. And in the two main cities, Johannesburg and Cape Town, the Jews constitute one-tenth of the citizens “that count”: the Whites . . .”⁸

Despite the economic gains of the Jewish community there was no commensurate cultural flowering or peculiarly South African focus of development. According to Bernard Sachs, a well-known Jewish literary and political writer in South Africa, the weakness of cultural development had as its corollary an expression of Jewish interests and activities “almost entirely through the channels of Zionism and philanthropy.”⁹ Rabbi Ungar also saw the effects of Jewish separateness both from the Afrikaner and British groupings as taking the form of “two main quasi-religious preoccupations . . . a numinous awe surrounding the separate sports club, and an enshrinement of Zionism in its most uncritically chauvinistic form.”¹⁰ Like other Jewish communities which left Czarist Russia after the pogroms of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, South African

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Andre Ungar, “The Abdication of a Community,” *Africa South*, Vol. 3 (January-March 1959), pp. 29-30.

(9) Sachs, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

(10) Ungar, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

Jews were especially attracted to the idea of political Zionism with its promise of a Jewish state. For statehood seemed the logical alternative to an existence where assimilation had either been prevented by government edict or fostered by Orthodox belief in the security offered Judaism by ghetto separation. Rejected on the social plane by both major white groups in South Africa, Jews found little stimulation to develop a South African Jewish culture.

Jewish institutions correspondingly reflected the Zionist priorities and interests of the community. The main organs of Jewish life were the South African Zionist Federation, founded in 1895 and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (1912). These bodies were not mutually exclusive, however, and even before 1948 Zionists not only "formed the majority of the Board of Deputies but also occupied the leading posts in the Jewish community."¹¹ By 1948 fully 99 per cent of South African Jews were Zionist affiliated.¹² In short, Zionism was without question the primary cultural expression and group concern of South African Jewry. Although Sachs estimated that the right-wing or revisionist form of Zionism accounted for only 15 per cent of the total Jewish strength while the moderate United Zionist party attracted the bulk of Jewish membership, considerable numbers of all factions were expressing strong contempt by 1944 for British opposition to extreme Zionist demands regarding Palestine.¹³ Thus, while Jews traditionally favored British attachments as a bulwark of democracy against the philosophy of the Nationalist Party, confrontation between Jewish terrorist groups and British soldiers in Palestine brought a substantial decline

(11) Sachs, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

(12) Sarah G. Millin, *The People of South Africa* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954), p. 236.

(13) Although the British Government had promised unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, by the late 1930's the contradictions of this promise (i.e. "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities . . .") as well as the demands of British Middle East strategy led to a reversal of policy. The British Government White Paper of 1939 promised to limit Jewish immigration thus guaranteeing an Arab majority. Cf. Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and United States Foreign Policy, 1942-1947* (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), pp. xx-xxi, 78.

in British orientation at the precise moment when the Nationalist Party was preparing its assault on continued South African attachments with the British Crown. Ironically, however, South African Jewish concern for Palestine was not merely the outgrowth of ordinary Zionist interests which, during the aftermath of Hitlerism, had won over American and British Jewry to Zionist political goals. It also reflected community concern that the increasing strength of the Nationalist Party might in fact necessitate a Jewish exodus.

The Nationalist Party Adopts a New Jewish Policy

Notwithstanding its legacy of virulent anti-Semitism the Nationalist Party had found reason by 1948 to modify dramatically its attitude towards the Jewish community. Not only was it a case of perceiving the necessity of white solidarity if a minority racial regime were to be maintained but rather the nature of the Jewish community itself and events involving Britain in Palestine made a new policy both attractive and expedient. According to Dr. Edwin S. Munger, a long-time observer of the South African scene, the post-war Jewish-Afrikaner *rapprochement* was also due to the feeling of highly influential Afrikaners that "the elimination of Jews from South Africa would shake the country to its foundations"¹⁴ since any implementation of discrimination would lead to the withdrawal by wealthy Jews of sufficient capital to precipitate an economic slump.

As the 1948 general election approached there were growing signs indicating a switch in Nationalist thought. Not only did the Afrikaners press support Zionist opposition to British policies in Palestine, which since 1939 had moved away from endorsing Jewish statehood against the wishes of the Arab majority, but it compared the determination of the Afrikaners to break the Union's British ties with the Zionist undertaking. In various localities Nationalist politicians openly began to seek the favor of influential Jews and

(14) Edwin S. Munger, "Jews and the National Party" (New York: American Universities Field Services, 1956), p. 2.

a dialogue was opened in Cape Town between several prominent Jews and leading Nationalists. Although Dr. Malan repeated his Party's opposition to additional Jewish immigration in October 1947, he argued that opposition was not because of anti-Jewish feeling but "because we want to prevent these feelings."¹⁵ But it was the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, only a few days before the May 26 election, which especially influenced Nationalist attitudes. According to Dr. Leslie Rubin, a South African exile and a co-founder of the Liberal Party (also Jewish and former senator representing Non-Whites) :

"...A strange mixture of motives made it easy for Malan (and Strijdom has faithfully followed his lead since) and the Nationalists to offer enthusiastic support to the new state. There was a sense of affinity with the Israelis in having thrown off the British yoke. A psychologist might have called it admiration for the achievement by another of what was for them still a suppressed desire. Then—this is the view which was put to me by a leading Afrikaner intellectual with genuine feeling—many Nationalists saw the success of the Jews against the Arabs as a victory of White over non-White. Malan himself, growing old, displayed and voiced with much fervour a highly emotional people-of-the-book enthusiasm for the restoration of the Jews to their ancient homeland in accordance with Biblical prophecy."¹⁶

Richard Weisbord has also observed that it was "...not coincidental that the turning away of the Nationalist Party from overt anti-Semitism occurred at the same time as the goal of the political Zionist movement, the creation of the state of Israel, was realized."¹⁷

Israel's declaration of independence had very immediate repercussions on South African politics in a most unexpected way, since

(15) *Die Transvaler*, 30 October 1947 as quoted and translated in Alexander Hepple, *Verwoerd* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 226.

(16) Leslie Rubin, "Afrikaner Nationalism and the Jews," *Africa South*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April-June 1957), p. 29.

(17) Weisbord, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

it raised the question of diplomatic recognition. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Smuts was a life-long supporter of Zionism and a close, personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader,¹⁸ Smuts only extended *de facto* recognition to the new state. Although reticence in this matter might have been due as much to Smuts' own regard for British sensibilities as to Anglo-South African sentiment, he also feared that the Nationalist Party would make political capital of an action so clearly welcome in the Jewish community.¹⁹ Ironically, the Prime Minister's action not only had the effect of alienating some English-speaking voters "who had no love for Jews of any kind and a bitter hatred of the gunmen of Palestine who were murdering British soldiers . . ."²⁰ but it enabled Dr. Malan to use Smuts' action to proclaim by way of contrast his own "true friendship" for the Jewish people, a people whose race-consciousness would enable them to "more easily understand and respect the same feeling in the case of every other section of the community."²¹ Immediately after the narrow Nationalist victory of May 26, the Malan Government extended *de jure* recognition to Israel.

Diplomatic recognition of Israel was quickly followed by other actions calculated to win Jewish support. Six weeks after taking office Dr. Malan declared that both he and his government stood for a policy of non-discrimination against any section of the White population and looked forward, he said, to the day when there would no longer be any talk of the Jewish question in the country.²² Going beyond the position of most other countries favorable to

(18) General Smuts, who represented the Union at the Imperial War Council, had been a supporter of Zionism from 1919. His relations with Weizmann and Zionism in South Africa are described in Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, *The Jews in South Africa* (Cape Town, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 281ff. Almost on the eve of the general election he dashed off to London to attend the seventy-fifth birthday celebration of his old friend, Dr. Chaim Weizmann. Cf. Walker, p. 788.

(19) Rubin, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(20) Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1965), p. 772.

(21) Cited in Weisbord, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

(22) Henry Katzew, "Jews in the Land of Apartheid," *Midstream*, Vol. 8 (December 1962), p. 68.

Israel, Dr. Malan not only permitted Jewish reserve officers to serve in Israel, a procedure officially contrary to law,²³ but he became the first Prime Minister in the British Commonwealth to pay a courtesy visit to the new state. When, despite serious financial problems then facing South Africa, the Government permitted the export of much needed commodities and currency to Israel, Malan's victory with the Jewish community was virtually complete. Thereafter the Jewish South African community would send more money per capita to Israel "than any Jewish group in the world—far exceeding the Americans—and a higher percentage of settlers ... [would go] to Israel from South Africa than ... [from] other countries where Jews are relatively prosperous."²⁴

The Consequences of Rapprochement

The response of the Jewish community to Nationalist support of Israel and its official abrogation of anti-Semitism brought about an acceptance of Nationalist Party policies at all levels of formal Jewish expression. In 1951 the Chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies extended sincere thanks to the Government for its pro-Israel sentiment and for appreciating the feelings of the Jewish community towards Israel.²⁵ At the same time, however, he expressed disappointment that Jews were still barred in most regions from Nationalist Party membership. Within a few months the Transvaal Congress of the Party lifted its ban on Jewish membership and this action was quickly followed by the Orange Free State and Natal Congresses. Subsequent elections in South Africa saw an ever growing number of Jews backing the Nationalist Party.²⁶ When Dr. Malan retired from official life in 1954 to be succeeded by Prime Minister Strijdom, South African Jewry "paid him its highest honor

(23) E. Feit, "Community in a Quandary: the South African Jewish Community and Apartheid," *Race*, Vol. 8 (April 1967), p. 406.

(24) Edwin S. Munger, *Afrikaner and African Nationalism: South African Parallels and Parameters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 20.

(25) *Cape Times*, June 1, 1951.

(26) Hepple, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

by inscribing his name in its Golden Book as recognition of his 'contribution to better racial understanding in South Africa. . . .'²⁷ Mr. Strijdom's Government continued to display a cordial attitude towards Israel and "as if to seal this strange interracial harmony, the Minister of Justice appointed Mr. Simon Kuper, the president of the South African Zionist Federation, to the Transvaal bench."²⁸ Again, in 1956, rather than being the victims of the pogrom anticipated by Keppel-Jones, a Jewish group honored Dr. Malan with a silver plate as the "Moses of the Afrikaner people."²⁹

Upon the election of Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1958 a deputation from the Jewish Board of Deputies extended formal congratulations. During a public exchange of letters with a Cape Town resident in September 1958 on the subject of Jewish participation in politics, Dr. Verwoerd assured all Jews that the policy pursued by Dr. Malan and Dr. Strijdom would be continued.³⁰ The Government's appointment in 1960 of Dr. Percy Yutar as Deputy Attorney-General of the Transvaal put to rest any lingering doubts which might have existed concerning the ability of Jews to attain high governmental positions. Yutar, as president of the Johannesburg United Hebrew Congregation and president of the South African Board of Education Fund, would distinguish himself as prosecutor in the infamous Rivonia trial of the African National Congress leader, Nelson Mandela and his associates, several of whom were Jewish; he was elevated in 1968 to become Attorney-General of the Orange Free State. The Prime Minister's assurances to the Jewish community also meant that South African Zionists would be permitted to continue sending some \$700,000.00 annually to Israel.³¹ Israeli gratitude for Dr. Verwoerd's attitude was formally expressed in April 1959 by Dr. M. Nurok, a visiting member of the Israeli parliament, who said:

(27) Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 922.

(28) Julius Lewin, "Appeasement in South Africa," *Nation*, Vol. 182 (April 14, 1956), p. 294.

(29) Munger, *Ibid.*, p. 63.

(30) *Die Burger*, 9 September 1958.

(31) Hepple, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

"We are very grateful to the South African Government for the part it has played in helping Israel to attain its present status. South African Jews who have settled in Israel are staunch patriots of the Union."³²

Before leaving South Africa Dr. Nurok invited the Prime Minister to visit Israel.

Such a cordial state of relations between the Nationalist Government and the Jewish community immediately raised the moral question of Jewish complicity in apartheid, a complicity which seemed to go considerably beyond that which might be attributed to other religious groups in South Africa. As Henry Katzew, assistant editor of the Johannesburg *Zionist Record*, acknowledged, the Jewish community found itself after 1948 in a unique situation "in which the government was sympathetic to the Jewish community and harsh and discriminating against other elements in the population, in this case, the Africans, Coloreds and Indians."³³

That a change in Nationalist Party attitudes towards the Jewish community correspondingly elicited a new attitude and stance on the part of organized Jewry has been fully documented. In 1946, for example, under the Smuts government, the Jewish Board of Deputies did not hesitate to support all "liberal causes" and freely expressed itself on issues of color and discrimination. In the Board's monthly journal, *Jewish Affairs*, established in 1946, there was no question of permitting the appearance of articles which ran counter to the Board's basic philosophy on race relations. In its first issue an article entitled "The Battle of South Africa" concluded that the battle against racialism and Fascism in South Africa was then entering its second stage. Subsequent editions featured articles reminding readers that "Judaism enjoins upon its preachers the fearless demand for social justice."³⁴ On the eve of the 1948 election *Jewish Affairs* said editorially that apartheid was

(32) *South African Scope*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1959).

(33) Katzew, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

“. . . a policy which the social and industrial realities of the day reduce to hopeless contradiction . . . It is doubtful whether there can be a specific Jewish viewpoint, but something, nevertheless, can be expected of the Jew. On racial issues he should take as liberal a view as possible. He should be profoundly sensitive to injustice arising from discrimination based on race or caste. He can and must be progressive.”³⁵

Immediately following the Nationalist Party victory the editor of *Jewish Affairs* again pointed out that “the only safeguard for peace lies in just treatment and the progressive promotion of the well-being and development of these underprivileged groups.”³⁶ But as Katzew admitted, “this was the last time *Jewish Affairs* was to speak in such emphatic terms.”³⁷

The impact of Dr. Malan’s June 1948 meeting with leading members of the Board of Deputies was quickly mirrored in the columns of *Jewish Affairs*. The next editorial simply expressed the hope that an unhappy chapter in the attitude of the Nationalist Party to the Jewish community had been closed; no reference was made to continuing discrimination against non-white groups. Thus, within a matter of weeks, the Board of Deputies had cast aside the expressed doctrine that Jewish security was best assured by support of all liberal causes “to the doctrine that the Board of Deputies is a non-political body which refrains from taking any position on party political issues and does not express views on the various race policies being advocated . . .”³⁸ This view was made official on July 8, 1951 when the Chairman of the Board, Mr. E.J. Horwitz, declared:

“The South African Jewish Board of Deputies . . . is a non-political body. It acts only in matters of common concern to all Jews, and since individual Jews have diversified political opinions, the Board itself cannot adopt a party political

(35) *Ibidem*.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 70.

(37) *Ibidem*.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 68.

attitude, and does not do so. But clearly the Board's neutrality in party politics does not imply that the individual Jewish citizen is, or should be, neutral."³⁹

According to Katzew, the Jews were simply responding as a people, not paragons, in its organized form, and thus "did not balk at a reconciliation which relieved them, but not the Africans, Indians and Coloreds . . ." In the Afrikaners, said Katzew, the Jews were now able to see "a brave people and we could not but note in them certain tenacities and identities of purpose similar to our own. We also deeply valued their attitude to Israel."⁴⁰ The Board of Deputies was thus of its own volition a casualty of apartheid. Although the field of community relations was originally seen as its major concern, it thereafter "did not think about other groups."⁴¹ Aside from support of Zionism and Israel there was now little left to receive the Board's attention.

The silence which descended upon the Jewish Board of Deputies and *Jewish Affairs* also enfolded the rest of the Jewish press. The synagogues too fell silent except for occasional challenges to apartheid delivered by Chief Rabbi L.I. Rabinowitz, but he soon found reason to emigrate to Israel. Speaking to the Eighth International Conference of the World Union for Progressive Judaism in London in July 1953, Rabbi Dr. M.C. Weiler candidly explained that,

"The Jews as a community had decided to take no stand on the native question, because they were involved with the problem of assisting Jewry in other lands. South African Jewry was doing more to help Israel than any other group. The community could not ask for the government's permission to export funds and goods, and at the same time, object to the government."⁴²

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 71.

(40) *Ibid.*, p. 72.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 67.

(42) Rabbi M.C. Weiler, Speech to Eighth International Conference of the World Union of Progressive Judaism, London, 1953 cited in F. Flesch documentation, p. 189.

Although Rabbi Andre Ungar, a British national, who from 1954 to 1956 was in charge of the Port Elizabeth Progressive Jewish Congregation, did not hesitate to condemn apartheid, according to the testimony of the South African government, he was publicly denounced by some members of his own synagogue.⁴³ These, like the Government, resented his assertion that "it is both theoretically and practically impossible [as a Jew] to opt out, because the very act of refusing to be openly committed amounts to an open commitment on the side of the *status quo*."⁴⁴ The Minister of the Interior thereupon refused to extend Rabbi Ungar's temporary residence permit and he was ordered out of the country before January 15, 1957.

Even the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, which brought condemnation of South Africa from most governments, including the United States, and virtually all religious bodies, did not succeed in breaking the silence of the South African Jewish press or the Board of Deputies. Instead, as Mr. Charles Hoppenstein, a member of the Board for thirty years affirmed in London a few months later, "A majority of us are supporting the Union Government's policy in connection with apartheid," and sincerely appreciated the fact that South Africa had opened its doors to more than 1,500 Jewish refugees from the Congo.⁴⁵

In keeping with the harmony that had been achieved in Jewish-Nationalist Party relations, the first comprehensive history of the South African Jewish community, edited by Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, entitled *The Jews in South Africa*,⁴⁶ was published in 1955. The intent of the volume was obvious—to establish that the Jewish community had made a substantial contribution to the development of South Africa. While much attention was paid to Zionism

(43) Union of South Africa, State Information Office to Mr. F. Flesch, January 14, 1958 (Letter in files of Mr. Flesch, 8094 Whitcomb, Detroit, Michigan).

(44) Ungar, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(45) *Jewish Chronicle* (London), September 2, 1960.

(46) Saron and Hotz, *ibid.*

significantly there was no chapter dealing directly with Judaism or any religious developments. The Zionist movement, according to the authors, had greater support from the South African Jewish community than from any other in the world and per capita gave more than any other community to the various appeals for Israel.⁴⁷ The authors did not deal at all with general political and social matters in the country except when "issues directly affecting Jews as a group came into the the political arena."⁴⁸ Even here, however, the anti-Semitic period of Nationalist Party history was passed over in a few pages.

A review of *The Jews of South Africa* by Dan Jacobson, a prominent South African Jewish writer, in the January 1957 issue of *Commentary* precipitated an interesting exchange with Ronald M. Segal, also a Jew, and editor of *Africa South*, which, until Segal's exile, was published in Cape Town. The Jacobson-Segal exchange most forcefully revealed the issues at stake and surfaced the major arguments advanced relative to Jewish silence on apartheid. For Jacobson, the decisive facts were that "no government could have been more scrupulously correct in its attitude towards the Jewish community" than Dr. Malan's government, and that this government, ". . .and its successor under Strijdom have continued the tradition of friendship toward the State of Israel initiated by General Smuts."⁴⁹ Jacobson allowed that

"The Jewish community does not oppose the present government because of any detestation of its Native policies, which have won it so much notoriety abroad. This fact would probably come as a surprise to some of the government's supporters, [Nationalists] who have had drummed into them over many years the old anti-Semitic identification of Jews with Communism, and who are aware of the prominence of some Jews in what left-wing political movements there are

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 283ff.

(48) *Ibid.*, preface.

(49) Jacobson, p. 43.

in South Africa. But, as a whole, Jews in South Africa have shown themselves to be no more immune from race prejudice than any other group. "Die schwarze" [the Blacks] are talked of as contemptuously at Jewish tea parties as they are at gatherings of English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites . . . The degree to which Jewish radicals or even more moderate "liberals" in South Africa are representative of the Jewish community is certainly very much less than their opponents suppose."⁵⁰

Such a state of affairs, Jacobson confessed, might "come as a surprise to readers outside South Africa, too, who feel that Jews have a duty to oppose racialism because they are Jews, whether it is directed against Jews or against others,"⁵¹ but he argued that this could not be the case in South Africa since

"...racialism in South Africa is not a government, not a movement, not a political party, but the very basis of society. South Africa has never been anything but racist, and yet so far it is a country in which Jews have managed to fare rather well. Many South African Jews see no *necessity* that South African color-consciousness must give rise to anti-Semitism: if there is, it is a necessity that after three hundred years in which to mature has not yet issued into action."⁵²

Moreover, Jacobson added, there were in South Africa "a few responsible Jewish religious and communal leaders whose concern about conditions in the country" stemmed directly from their interpretation of Jewish ethic and experience. While not many, he said, "they are the least likely to speak wildly about the Jews throwing their lot in with the Natives . . ." Finally, Jacobson argued, the only group in South Africa who persistently called upon the Jews to so associate themselves with Blacks were the Communists, "who, like Communists

(50) *Ibidem.*

(51) *Ibid.*, p. 44.

(52) *Ibidem.*

anywhere else in the world, make appeals that are permitted by contempt for the fate of particular people in particular situations . . .”⁵³

In reply to Jacobson’s assessment of the realities of South African life, Segal charged that South African Jewry’s concern for “justice” had been confined to narrow Jewish interests. “I remember,” he said, “the public meetings and the interminable private discussions during the weeks before the establishment of Israel, the cry to the nations in the name of humanity and right, the wringing of hands over Britain as a country that had lost sight of the just.” While “they quickly grew furious over the treatment of Israel,” said Segal, “they watch with complacency the innumerable daily manifestations of apartheid . . .”⁵⁴ He recalled:

“How many South African Jews of status in the community have I not heard condoning and even casually commending the worst horrors of ‘apartheid’ and, almost within the same breath, pleading for the world to acknowledge at last the cruelties of the Nasser regime. The South African Jewish community was outraged by the seizure of Jewish property and the internment of Jewish civilians in Egypt. It protested publicly and vigorously against the injustice. Yet, when the Africans of Sophiatown were dispossessed of their homes and their right to own land and property in Johannesburg, when they were driven from their houses in the early morning between lines of armed police, how many leaders of Jewish communal organizations protested? There was not one public statement, not one deputation, no deputations to the government were made. No wonder then that the late Field Marshal Smuts is a folk hero of the South African Jewish community.”⁵⁵

(53) *Ibid.*, p. 45.

(54) Dan Jacobson and Ronald Segal, “Apartheid and South African Jewry: An Exchange,” *Commentary*, Vol. 24 (November 1957), p. 424.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 425.

Segal charged that the excuse that Jews could not protest officially against particular legislation was not only "ludicrous" but in the context of the Jewish community's general pattern of behavior, "hypocritical" since they "persistently deliver themselves of communal opinions on the conduct of affairs in the Middle East, and that is surely much less their concern than a law herding into ghettos the various races of South Africa . . ." Failure to speak out on these issues, said Segal, then raised the fatal question:

"If the Jews are not a race like the Indians, nor a religious community like the Anglicans, what precisely are they, in their own eyes? If they are only just South Africans and nothing else, then the Jewish Board of Deputies has no business to exist, and the Zionist Federation works for Israel under totally false pretenses."⁵⁶

Replying to Segal's charges, and stung by his allusions to Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Baptist and Presbyterian condemnation of apartheid—sometimes resulting in exile, imprisonment and harrassment, Jacobson replied that "there are no black Jews, while there are black Anglicans, Catholics, Methodists and the rest" so they had a vested interest in looking after their own. While admitting that the Jewish community "has settled into what is admittedly an unheroic posture; it raises its voice when it feels its own immediate interests are threatened (whether by Soviet-Egyptian policy in the Middle East, or local immigration laws) and for the rest it keeps mum."⁵⁷

Nor would Jacobson, like other defenders of the Jewish-Nationalist *rapprochement*, accept the idea that there was a Jewish tradition enjoining on Jews a mode of conduct to follow in a situation like South Africa, for it was impossible to imagine "that any community will ever sacrifice itself for the sake of another."⁵⁸

(56) *Ibidem*.

(57) *Ibid.*, p. 429.

(58) *Ibid.*, p. 430.

A Temporary Reversal: Israeli Condemnation of Apartheid, 1961

From 1948 until mid-1961 Nationalist Party spokesmen, the Government and the Afrikaans press were unstinting in their praise of Israel. But suddenly, in July 1961, this harmonious atmosphere was shattered by Israel's decision to expand her diplomatic offensive in Black Africa which had been under way since 1956.⁵⁹ Seizing the occasion of the visit to Israel by the President of Upper Volta, the Israeli Government issued a statement terming apartheid "as disadvantageous to the interests of the non-white majority of the land." Then in October 1961 Israel voted in the Political Committee of the United Nations to censure a speech by the South African delegate, Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finally, in November Israel cast its vote in the General Assembly in support of a resolution which deprecated South Africa's policy of apartheid "as being reprehensible and repugnant to the dignity and rights of peoples and individuals."⁶⁰

The response of the South African Government and the Afrikaans press to Israel's "about-face" was predictably bitter. *Die Transvaler* asked what the government of Israel would think if, uninvited, South Africa concerned itself with Arab refugees who, for thirteen years, "lived on Israel's borders in the most wretched conditions because they are not allowed to return to their original homes." In a question difficult to answer in terms of premises accepted by both Afrikaners and Zionists, *Die Transvaler* asked:

(59) Cf. Samuel Decalo, "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Third World," *Orbis*, Vol. 11 (Fall 1967), pp. 724-745.

(60) Cited in Henry Katzew, "South Africa: A Country Without Friends," *Midstream* (Spring 1962), p. 73. According to Mr. Harold Soref, a delegate to the Council of the Anglo-Jewish Association in November 1962 (London) "It was . . . a complete misunderstanding to look on Israeli action as a moral stand. Israeli diplomats had visited the emergent African States and they sought support from these States against the Arabs at the U.N. They were perfectly entitled to do this, but to regard their action as being based on moral grounds was a euphemism." *Jewish Chronicle* (London), November 30, 1962.

"And is there any real difference between the way that the people of Israel are trying to maintain themselves amid non-Jewish peoples and the way the Afrikaner is trying to remain what he is? The people of Israel base themselves upon the Old Testament to explain why they do not wish to mix with other people: the Afrikaner does this too . . ."61

Mr. Louw accused Israel of "hostility and ingratitude . . . in view of the fact that the South African government and individual members of the Cabinet have in the past gone out of their way to foster good relations with Israel."62 Dr. Verwoerd lashed out by making the unflattering observation that the Jews "took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. In that I agree with them, Israel, like South Africa, is an apartheid state."63 And in a private letter which was "leaked" to the *Sunday Press*, Dr. Verwoerd expressed regret to a Jewish correspondent that "the whole situation with Israel has become fluid after there had been so much sympathy for Israel in South Africa." Israel's actions, said the Prime Minister, were a tragedy for the Jews in South Africa, but he noted that the pro-South African reaction of the Jewish press had somewhat relieved the situation. He went on to say that,

"People are beginning to ask why, if Israel and its Rabbis feel impelled to attack the policy of separate development here, the policy of separate development in Israel is not wrong in their eyes as well . . . it may not be said that they wish to differentiate in separate states because of religious and not racial differences, because if differentiation is wrong on one score it is also wrong on another . . . we believed in the separate state of Israel, but now begin to wonder whether that support should be withdrawn if, according to their own convictions, the ideal of separate development is funda-

(61) Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 73.

(62) Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 74.

(63) *Rand Daily Mail*, November 23, 1961.

mentally wrong. You see, therefore, that the action of Israel has set in train a new line of thought.”⁶⁴

Thereafter the Government rescinded the special concessions in foreign currency regulations which allowed Jewish organizations to transfer money and goods to Israel despite the restrictions in effect since Sharpeville. Henceforth applications for the transfer of funds would be considered on their merits.

South African Jews were also horrified by Israel's actions and severely discomfited by the Prime Minister's remarks. The *Zionist Record*, official organ of the South African Zionist Federation, voiced regret that "Israel's delegation found it fitting to vote with the 67 rather than abstain with the Western group of nations . . ." ⁶⁵ The *Jewish Herald*, organ of the Zionist Revisionists, sharply criticized Israel for voting against "one of Israel's staunchest friends as unwarranted, unjustified and politically unrealistic." It belittled Israel's decision to place priority on winning dubious Afro-Asian friendship.⁶⁶

The South African Jewish Board of Deputies passed a resolution stating that "Israel should have joined the other western nations in abstaining from voting against South Africa."⁶⁷ Recognizing the unprecedented nature of such a resolution, the Board called upon Mr. Arthur Suzman, a prominent lawyer and chairman of the Board's Public Relations Committee, to give an explanation of its action. Interestingly enough, although Mr. Suzman was himself a member of the Progressive Party which provided the government with its most bitter parliamentary opposition on race issues, he explained that while the Board of Deputies had no *locus standi* for expressing views on Israel's foreign policy, they felt that by censuring South Africa Israel had stifled the right of free speech in the United Nations. "As Jewish citizens of South Africa who have special ties

(64) Cited in Katzew, *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(65) Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 74.

(66) Cited in *Ibidem*.

(67) Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

with Israel," said Mr. Suzman, "it was felt that the South African Jewish Board of Deputies should draw Israel's attention to this aspect of the matter."⁶⁸ In the back of many Jewish minds was the analogy between the Afrikaner and Israeli positions and they could not help but ask, said Mr. Katzew, whether there were "any circumstances at present imaginable in which the Jews of Israel would consent to share power with an Arab majority" any more than Afrikaners would with Africans.⁶⁹

But in response to suggestions from Dr. Verwoerd that the Jewish community should in any way be held accountable for Israel's actions, there was a forthright declaration in the *Jewish Times* that Jews must stand firm for their rights and dignity.⁷⁰ Shortly thereafter Dr. Verwoerd publicly stated that "neither the actions of Israel at the United Nations nor the actions of certain people in the land must lead to the existence of anti-Semitism."⁷¹ The matter was then brought to a close when the Board of Deputies expressed its satisfaction with Dr. Verwoerd's explanation that his criticism of Israel had nothing to do with the Government's attitude towards Jewish citizens. Following the Prime Minister's assassination in September 1966, the *South African Jewish Times* could write of Verwoerd:

"It was one of the marks of his statesmanship that he curbed past currents which sometimes washed against the Jewish community, set himself up against any form of discrimination against Jews and appealed for the complete eradication of anti-Semitism from South African life."⁷²

Verwoerd's reputation among the Jewish community was also seen in the overflow crowds at Johannesburg's Great Synagogue for a service of mourning held under the auspices of the Federation of

(68) Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 75.

(69) *Ibidem.*

(70) *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(71) *Ibid.*, p. 77.

(72) *South African Jewish Times*, 9 September 1966.

Synagogues of South Africa. On that occasion Chief Rabbi Casper described Verwoerd "in true scriptural sense a man of valour." In Cape Town Chief Rabbi Professor Abrahams said at a memorial service that Dr. Verwoerd was "a man of sincerity and of deep integrity . . . a moral conscience underlay his policies: he was the first man to give apartheid a moral ground."⁷³ The Senior Rabbi of the Progressive Jewish Congregation, Rabbi Arthur Super, was even more glowing in his praise and described Dr. Verwoerd as

"...one of the greatest, if not the greatest prime minister South Africa has ever produced . . . Here was a man, who, like Moses of old, had led his people through the promised land after sixty years of wandering. He had the courage and the strength to establish the Republic of South Africa and so dissolve in one act the old heritage of hatred, communal jealousies, blurred loyalties, old grudges and past grievances which were preventing South Africa from becoming one nation."⁷⁴

Reconciliation: Organized Jewry Defends South Africa Abroad

Whatever the apprehension Dr. Verwoerd's remarks had occasioned in the Jewish community there was no rupture in friendly relations with the Government. Rather, either through fear of a revival of anti-Semitism, a belief in the South African system, or determination to carry on unimpeded with assistance to Israel, there was a notable increase in the efforts of the Board of Deputies and Zionist organizations to deflect criticism abroad of South Africa by other Jewish bodies. Following the approval of a statement by the Board of Deputies that "the Jewish community should take steps to explain South Africa's position to Jews overseas and at home,"⁷⁵ a number of prominent Jews would assist with efforts to improve South Africa's image. This decision was in keeping with the sentiments expressed by the Chief Rabbi Dr. Abrahams, who declared:

(73) *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 September 1966.

(74) *Ibidem*.

(75) *Jewish Chronicle* (London), and December 1962.

"I have the utmost faith in the destiny of the Republic of South Africa and the destiny of the South African Jewish community . . . The Jewish faith makes loyalty to our country of domicile mandatory and, in truth, we are among the most loyal citizens of this country. So we shall continue to be."⁷⁶

In 1961 Mr. Gustav Saron, co-author of *The Jews in South Africa*, and retired secretary-general of the Board of Deputies visited the United States and lectured under the auspices of B'nai B'rith. Always he urged on his audiences the necessity to respect South African sensitivities. And Mr. Henry Katzen, assistant editor of the Johannesburg *Zionist Record* would put the case for South Africa in the Jewish publication *Midstream* where he argued that

"...if the world granted South Africa time to work out its own evolution, it could probably do so. The United Nations should keep barking at us to keep us on our political toes, but it would be shortsighted and wrong for it to press for sanctions against us and thus encompass our ruin . . . It would be a gain if the world were to perceive that the problems of a rooted White nation in Africa are real."⁷⁷

Even before Israel's anti-South African stance of 1961, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies had counselled Jewish organizations abroad to refrain from commenting on South African problems. Thus, over the years, there would be no Jewish contributions to discussions on apartheid held under United Nations auspices. Like South Africa, all of the Jewish non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the United Nations—including the World Agudat, the World Union for Progressive Judaism, the World Jewish Congress, the Co-ordinating Board of Jewish Organizations (comprising the British and South African Jewish Boards of Deputies and the B'nai B'rith) and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations (American Jewish Committee, the

(76) *Ibidem*.

(77) Katzew, "South Africa: A Country Without Friends," *ibid.*, p. 92.

Alliance of France and the Anglo-Jewish Association)—declined to discuss the apartheid question.

The history of world Jewish non-involvement in anti-apartheid efforts has been the main concern of Mr. Fritz Flesch of Detroit, himself a Jewish victim of Nazism at Dachau between 1938 and 1939. His investigations, covering more than a decade of activity, have not only documented the position of the South African Jewish community but, in Rabbi Ungar's words, have revealed the general "pattern of evasion" displayed by world Jewish leadership in response to South African initiatives.⁷⁸ In a revealing response to Flesch's inquiry to the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations relative to their abstention from the apartheid issue, he was informed that "the policy of the Consultative Council has been to refrain from intervening in all but emergency situations immediately affecting our coreligionists."⁷⁹ A similar inquiry to the World Jewish Congress brought a stinging rejoinder from Rabbi Maurice L. Perlzweig to the effect that,

"The Jewish non-governmental organizations have refrained from commenting on South African problems because they do not desire to worsen the already difficult situation in which the Jewish community finds itself. And they know that this restraint, whatever the arguments against it may be, is regarded as important by that community."

"To put it another way, we do not admire vicarious heroism..."

"Moreover, the World Jewish Congress is precluded by its Constitution from undertaking any activity in relation to any country which has a Jewish community that can speak for itself, unless that community either requests or permits it. ..."

"I take the liberty of suggesting that you might usefully turn your abundant energies to the problems of racialism at home

(78) Andre Ungar, "Profile of a Stubborn Man" (unpublished manuscript in Fritz Flesch collection).

(79) Moses Moskowitz to Fritz Flesch, February 13, 1959.

in the knowledge that any improvement in this area will be an effective contribution to the fight elsewhere.”⁸⁰

Whatever Rabbi Perlzweig meant by the danger of “worsening the already difficult situation,” the situation in South Africa hardly revealed the Jewish community in any jeopardy. On the contrary, as Mr. Aaron Mendelow, an executive member of the Board of Deputies stated, a report in a New York newspaper that Jews had been deeply disturbed by anti-Jewish remarks in Parliament was “arrant rubbish.” “South African Jews,” he said, “have for better or for worse, cast in their lot with other South Africans, and we are proud of the fact that we have always acted as an integral part of the South African community.”⁸¹ That the World Jewish Congress should resist any attack on the position of the Jewish community in South Africa was readily understandable, however, in the light of an earlier statement by Dr. Israel Goldstein, chairman of the Western Hemisphere Executive of that organization. After visiting South Africa in late 1959, Dr. Goldstein had reported to the Congress that the South African Jewish community was “the most Jewish-spirited community outside of Israel . . . and deserves its reputation . . . as measured by the criteria of synagogue affiliation, Jewish education and Zionist devotion, including not only their response to fund-raising appeals for Israel but immigration, pioneering and investments in Israel.”⁸² Dr. Goldstein’s remarks were reported in all the various official publications of the South African Information Office.

Efforts to dissuade American Jewish organizations from condemning apartheid have had limited success. The American Jewish Congress, for example, has affirmed on various occasions its opposition to South Africa’s racial policies. The outstanding examples of Jewish Americans, such as Mr. Peter Weiss, Board Chairman of the American Committee on Africa, who over the years has devoted

(80) Maurice L. Perlzweig to Fritz Flesch, April 5, 1963.

(81) *Rand Daily Mail*, July 2, 1964.

(82) *South African Scope*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (September 1959).

considerable time and energy to combatting apartheid, also run counter to the efforts of South African Jewish and Zionist organizations. The approach of those who put the well-being of the South African Jewish community before any other consideration and who value its support for Israel over racism in South Africa, have had their point of view most forcefully asserted by Mr. Samuel H. Wang of New York. A man of considerable wealth, Mr. Wang regularly sponsors advertisements in the *New York Times* in support of Israel and against "Arab barbarism." In reaction to the endorsement by the American Jewish Congress of an advertisement sponsored by the American Committee on Africa protesting the granting of landing rights to the South African Airways,⁸³ Mr. Wang attacked the Congress for "employing a misnomer" and being a "self-appointed" spokesman of American Jewry. Wang charged that the Congress, in virtue of its stand against apartheid, was

"...acting contrary to Jewish interests. Your effort against the South African airlines is a pertinent example justifying this charge."

"Your anti-South African campaign, speaking in the name of American Jewry, is putting the distinguished South African Jewish Community in a serious predicament."

"No doubt, it will raise anti-Jewish feelings among the majority of South African citizens who uphold and support their Government. The South African Jews who are noted for their devotion to the cause of Jewry and who are in the forefront with their contribution to Jewish world needs, surely deserve more concern from responsible Jewish organizations."⁸⁴

Israel, South Africa and Zionism

The Zionist character of the South African Jewish community and its concern for the well-being of the State of Israel has had a

(83) *New York Times*, May 28, 1969.

(84) *New York Times*, June 6, 1969.

profound impact on Israeli-South African relations. The growing political influence of the Jewish community upon the governmental and National Party structure, the natural sympathy of the Afrikaner populace with Zionist/Israeli philosophy and goals, as well as South African international priorities have combined to strengthen the pragmatic aspects of Israeli-South African relations. Thus, despite the setback in official relations resulting from Israel's 1961 condemnation of apartheid and subsequent reaffirmations of the same, the force of these countervailing currents had substantially filled the breach. As the South African Foundation, in its confidential newsletter, *Background To South African and World News* noted in July 1967, the links between Israel and South Africa have been forged on a variety of levels over the years. It pointed out, for example, that

"Several former South Africans hold prominent positions in Israel, such as Mr. Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, who was born in Cape Town, and Mr. Pincus, also born in South Africa, who was in 1966 elected chairman of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, the controlling body of the World Zionist Organization."⁸⁵

South African concern with possible Soviet penetration into Africa and fear of Communist subversion of the country's political-social system elicited an early concern with Middle East defense arrangements advanced by the Western bloc, and served to complement Zionist efforts. As Dr. Malan informed the House of Assembly in April 1952, South Africa stood ready to cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth to create a Middle East Command "to stop the enemy from coming through the Middle East and from invading Africa through Egypt in the event of war . . . what happens higher up in Africa must necessarily affect us."⁸⁶ In keeping with this concern, if not reci-

(85) South African Foundation, *Background to South African and World News* (Confidential), July 1967, p. 1.

(86) *Ibid.*, cf. Jitendra Mohan, "South Africa and the Suez Crisis," *International Journal* (Autumn 1961), Vol. 16, p. 333

procating it, Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, visited South Africa shortly after the creation of Israel and an Israeli destroyer paid a courtesy call.

The military overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952 and subsequent Pan-Africanist initiatives by the Nasser government occasioned growing South African alarm and concern for North African and Middle East affairs. Thus, the Suez crisis of 1956, while formally viewed as an internal affair, saw a basic South African sympathy for the tripartite powers and the Union conspicuously refrained from condemning the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. "Some among the Afrikaner Nationalists," as Jitendra Mohan has observed, "found in the Suez crisis an opportunity for renewing their faith in the Union's race policies. This was done in the context of the general support enjoyed by Nasser's Egypt among the non-whites of Africa as the standard bearer of their emancipation from the Europeans."⁸⁷ Throughout all stages of the Suez crisis the tone of sympathy for Israel persisted in the South African press.

Israel's 1961 "about-face" also came at a time, as the South African Foundation observed, when Israel's exports were reaching nearly \$84 million a year of which only \$1.4 million went to South Africa. On the other side of the ledger, however, between 1951 and 1961 it was stated that South African Jews had sent more than \$19.6 million to Israel.⁸⁸ The temporary restriction on this outflow was followed by the Israeli decision in September 1963 not to replace her Minister in South Africa and to reduce diplomatic representation to the level of "chargé d'affaires." Even here, however, the actual state of Israeli-South African relations was not fully evident. For while recriminations increased on the international level so did the volume of trade between the two countries. Israeli exports to South Africa thus increased from \$1.4 million in 1961 to \$4 million in 1967 while imports reached \$3.3 million for the same

(87) Mohan, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

(88) South African Foundation, *ibid.*, p. 2.

year.⁸⁹ Although Israel's trade with South Africa represented only a fraction of its total, by 1967 South Africa had become Israel's chief trading partner in Africa.

An interesting political analysis of the South African scene by Paul Giniewski, a prominent French Zionist writer, appeared in 1965 which, under the circumstances, seemed to indicate a new effort to conciliate South African sensibilities. Giniewski, the author of *Israël Devant l'Afrique et l'Asie*, now published *The Two Faces of Apartheid* in which he advanced a new theory in support of apartheid. Apartheid, with its Bantustan concept, argued Giniewski, was nothing more than "Bantu Zionism" which alone could preserve African interests. Drawing numerous parallels with Zionist efforts in Palestine, Giniewski asserted that "from the Bantu people themselves must come the visionaries who will dream the Bantustans of tomorrow, who will take the people toward the resurrected country, as Herzl dreamed and realized the Jewish state."⁹⁰ This counsel to a majority of South Africa's people to acquiesce in accepting about 16 per cent of the country's more barren land on a subservient political basis was endorsed in the book's preface by Clarence Randall, president of U.S. Inland Steel, and a prominent American apologist for South Africa.

Whatever official South African resentment remained against Israel, the June War of 1967 effectively served to minimize its expression. In an outpouring of pro-Israeli sentiment, Dr. Voster's government not only permitted South African volunteers to work in civilian and para-military capacities in Israel, but permission was given Zionist groups to send out more than \$28 million to Israel.⁹¹ Soon Israel's new Trade Commissioner to South Africa announced that existing programs would be vastly expanded, and the South

(89) Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1968, No. 19, p. 212.

(90) Paul Giniewski, *The Two Faces of Apartheid* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), p. 349.

(91) AMAX, *Summary of Press Coverage, South Africa* (August 15, 1968), p. 3.

Africa Foundation, the country's most sophisticated propaganda institution, undertook to subsidize the founding of an Israeli-South African Committee.⁹² One of the first activities of this body was to bring the editor of an influential Israeli daily to South Africa. In subsequent editorials it was reported that he had recommended closer political and economic ties between Israel and South Africa.⁹³ That Israel should also be strengthening her developmental programs and hosting prime ministers from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi, states in which South African influence was all but dominant, did not go unnoticed in South Africa. These states, as South Africa expected, would hopefully play a "moderating" role between South Africa and its black neighbors to the north. At the same time they would distinguish themselves as supporters of Israeli policies in United Nations debate. In short, South Africa had not only found reason to ignore certain Israeli stances, but Israel had found reason to cultivate South African friendship in practical if unspectacular ways.

Conclusion

The dilemma or quandary of the South African Jewish community has been discussed by various writers as a struggle between conscience and political realism. Professor Edward Feit has observed that while it is easy for others to urge upon the Jewish community heroic gestures from many thousands of miles, the Jews would be faced with the possibility of overt governmental hostility.⁹⁴ But whatever the moral aspects of the situation the fact remains that it has long been irrelevant to debate the issue as though an alternative policy might be adopted. If ever there was a meaningful struggle between conscience and "political realism," resistance was extremely short-lived. As Rabbi Miller, an American Reform rabbi serving in Durban for sixteen years succinctly observed, any rabbi who sup-

(92) *Newsweek*, March 22, 1968.

(93) *Ibid.*

(94) E. Feit, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

ported or engaged in overt civil rights activity would lose his pulpit overnight. "I went to South Africa," said Rabbi Miller, "to serve the Jewish community, not to become a martyr. The laws of the United States and the interpretations by the Supreme Court are in favor of integration, so that people in the civil rights movement are not only following their conscience and their interpretation of Judaism, but at the same time are good citizens. That situation does not exist in South Africa because its laws are for separate development." Rabbi Miller also noted that he intended to live in South Africa for three more years and then move to Israel.⁹⁵

But whether in the minds of the black majority of South Africa the self-interest of any white community, especially as directed abroad and flowing from exploitation of the country's black labor, can override the existential moral imperatives of South African life is highly dubious. That South African Jews might legitimately turn away from the blatant racial injustice of the Republic, and then, if occasion should require, emigrate to Israel, seems even less acceptable. South Africa's Jewish community, in the eyes of South African blacks, shares the same burden as the rest of that country's dominant group and would consequently share its fate. Given the position expressed by Rabbi Levi A. Olan, president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis that Christian churches had failed in their moral duty "to support Israel in its struggle to survive,"⁹⁶ it would not be unreasonable to believe that the Africans of South Africa will reject a moral framework for the Jewish community which operates without reference to their own determination to survive and claim that which is their own. And in the broader sense, the inter-relationship of Zionism, apartheid and Israel possess problems of fundamental morality which will be of greater concern to the Black American community not only as it ponders its relationship to the moral and political aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Arab relations, but as it asserts its concern for the well-being of the disenfranchised Black majority of South Africa.

(95) *National Jewish Post and Opinion*, July 15, 1966.

(96) *New York Times*, June 17, 1969.

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